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Family rights for naturalized EU citizens: Lounes 
 
Case C-165/16, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
EU:C:2017:862, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 14 
November 2017 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With Commission v. UK,1 it has been said that the Court “has played politics and 
lost”. 2  Decided nine days before the UK referendum on EU Membership, it 
followed a set of cases – Dano, Alimanovic and Garcia Nieto3 – where the Court 
suddenly expressed great deference towards the EU legislature. As a result, part of 
its EU citizenship case law was dismantled and social rights for “inactive” EU 
citizens were limited. It may also be said that the Court has played politics in 
Lounes, released in the middle of Brexit talks. Answering a reference from a British 
Court, it decided that in some cases, EU citizens who acquire British citizenship 
can still rely on EU law to live with their third country national spouse in the UK. 
Notwithstanding that the situation of the case was not related to Brexit, the answer 
of the Court is of crucial importance for EU citizens living in the UK or British 
citizens living in another Member State. 
The presence of emblematic cases such as Martínez Sala, Garcia Avello or 
Metock4 could be read between the lines in Lounes. The case deals with family 
reunification for nationals residing in their State of nationality. In principle, EU 
citizens residing in their State of nationality cannot rely on EU law to obtain a 
derived right of residence for their family members. Nonetheless, the Court has long 
held that there are some exceptions to this rule. This is the case with situations 
having a “transnational element”: when the citizen has exercised his freedom of 
movement and is returning to his Member State of nationality (Singh model)5 or 
when the citizen is engaged in an economic activity in another Member State 
(Carpenter model). 6  In other situations, very exceptionally, a derived right of 
residence has been recognized when its absence would force the citizen to leave the 
EU territory as a whole (Ruiz Zambrano model).7 In this last series of cases, the 
                                                     
1Case C-308/14, European Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
EU:C:2016:436. 
2O’Brien, “The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain: Commission v. United Kingdom”, 54 CML 
Rev. (2017), 209-244. 
3Case C-333/13, Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, EU:C:2014:2358; Case-C-
67/14, Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v. Nazifa Alimanovic and Others, EU:C:2015:597; C-299/14, 
Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v. Jovanna García-Nieto and Others, 
EU:C:2016:114. 
4Case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, EU:C:1998:217; Case C-148/02, Carlos 
Garcia Avello v. Belgian State, EU:C:2003:539; Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others 
v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, EU:C:2008:449. 
5Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary 
of State for Home Department, EU:C:1992:296. 
6Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2002:434. 
7Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), EU:C:2011:124. 
  
right of residence is directly based on the status of EU citizen conferred by Article 
20 TFEU and not on Article 21 TFEU, stating that “every citizen of the Union shall 
have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”. 
The situation of dual nationals is less clear. In McCarthy8 the Court refused to 
apply Article 21 TFEU in the case of a dual national residing in her State of 
nationality who had never exercised her freedom of movement.9 In Lounes, Ms 
Oramzabal, a Spanish national who acquired British citizenship, had exercised her 
freedom of movement and had kept her Spanish nationality. The question of 
whether she was in a different situation to Ms McCarthy because she had moved 
was discussed before the referring Court. Unsurprisingly, the ECJ decided that the 
acquisition of British citizenship by Ms Ormazabal does not imply that she is in “a 
purely domestic situation”. 
Nonetheless, this does not in itself justify a derived right of residence for her 
husband. In that respect, the ruling under examination is rather confusing. 
Numerous lines of reasoning are proposed but most of the time they are incomplete. 
They are superimposed and intertwined more than properly articulated. Lounes may 
be read as a further step in the development of EU citizenship. Indeed, it is the first 
time that the Court states so clearly that Article 21 TFEU entails a right to lead a 
normal family life. Moreover, the case arguably adds a new dimension to the 
naturalization of an EU citizen in her Member State of residence. Naturalization is 
seen as the prolongation of EU citizens’ integration in the host Member State, which 
is itself seen as the prolongation of free movement rights. Only future interpretation 
will determine whether Lounes will become one of the milestones of the Court’s 
citizenship case law. 
 
 
2. Factual and legal background 
 
Ms Ormazabal, a Spanish national, moved to the UK as a student in 1996. Since 
2004, she has worked full-time for the Turkish Embassy in London. In 2009, after 
thirteen years of residence, she acquired British citizenship, while also retaining her 
Spanish nationality. She married Mr Lounes in 2014. The latter, a national of 
Algeria, entered the UK on a six-month visitor visa in 2010 and overstayed illegally. 
After their wedding, he applied to the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
for an EEA residence card as the family member of his wife, pursuant to the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulation 2006, the UK legislation 
transposing Directive 2004/38 (the “EEA Regulation 2006”). This brought him to 
the attention of the immigration authorities and he was soon served with a notice 
informing him that he was liable to removal on the grounds that he had overstayed 
in the UK in breach of immigration control, and with notice of a decision to remove 
him from the UK. In addition, the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
answered negatively to his application for an EEA residence card. It took the view 
that Ms Ormazabal was no longer regarded as an “EEA national” because she had 
acquired British nationality, even though she was still a Spanish national. 
                                                     
8Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2011:277. 
9Ms McCarthy did not reach the threshold that is required for Art. 20 TFEU to apply directly. 
  
The term “EEA national” has been preferred to “EU citizen” in the EEA 
Regulation 2006 – reminding us that Directive 2004/38 is not reserved to EU 
citizens but is a text with EEA relevance, and wiping away the symbolic baggage 
of the term “citizen”. The Regulation’s Part 1, 2(1), defining who counts as an “EEA 
national”, has been amended two times. Originally, it stated that for the Regulation, 
“EEA national” meant a national of an “EEA State”, the UK being excluded, and 
Switzerland being included. Therefore, UK citizens also having the nationality of 
another EEA State or Switzerland counted as EEA nationals. Following the 
amendment of 16 October 2012, it read “‘EEA’ national” means a national of an 
EEA State who is not also a United Kingdom national”. It has since been re-
amended: since 8 November 2012, the designation “United Kingdom national” has 
been replaced by “British citizen”. The first change is presented in the Explanatory 
Note accompanying the amendment as reflecting the McCarthy judgment.10 The 
second one is presented in the Explanatory Memorandum as correcting the previous 
one, because British citizens rather than UK nationals have the right of abode in the 
UK.11 
After the amendments came into force, his sponsor not being an EEA national 
within the meaning of the national regulation transposing Directive 2004/38, Mr 
Lounes could not benefit from its provisions. He was thus invited to consider an 
application to remain in the UK on other grounds (Immigration rules and Art. 8 
ECHR). Mr Lounes brought a claim before the High Court of Justice of England 
and Wales, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) against this decision. 
This court had doubts as to the compatibility with EU law of this amendment of the 
EEA Regulation, and of the decision that Mrs Ormazabal could no longer rely on 
her rights as a Union citizen conferred by Directive 2004/38. It enquired as to the 
scope ratione personae of the Directive: can an EU citizen, having exercised her 
right of free movement and having subsequently acquired the nationality of the host 
Member State while keeping her former nationality, still rely, for her own benefit 
or for the benefit of her spouse, upon the rights conferred by Directive 2004/38? 
 
 
3. Opinion of Advocate General Bot 
 
Advocate General Bot began his analysis with “a preliminary remark” aiming to 
ensure that the situation should not be taken as a purely domestic one. First, he 
affirmed that there is an “inextricable link” between the exercise of the right 
conferred on the citizen by Directive 2004/38, and her acquisition of British 
citizenship: the exercise of her rights of free movement and residence entitled her 
to a right of permanent residence pursuant to EU law on the basis of which she 
acquired British citizenship.12 “[T]he connecting factor with EU law, and with the 
                                                     
10Explanatory note to SI 2012/1547. See Lounes, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2016] EWHC 436 (Admin), para 25. 
11Explanatory memorandum to SI 2012/1547. See Lounes, R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, para 26. 
12It was disputed that Ms Ormazabal has resided in the UK under Art. 16 of Directive 2004/38 before 
the national court. The UK Government accepted it later. See Judgment, para 38. 
  
provision of Directive 2004/38, is obvious”.13 Then, alluding to Rottmann,14 he 
stated that “the situation of Union citizens who … are placed by reason of their 
naturalization in a situation liable to entail the loss of the rights conferred by 
Directive 2004/38, falls, because of its nature and its consequences, within the 
ambit of EU law”. 15  Advocate General Bot then used the “retained power 
formula”, 16  this time referring directly to Rottmann, to assert that while the 
conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality fall within the competence of 
the Member States, they should have due regard to EU law when exercising their 
competences. 
Coming to the High Court’s question, the Advocate General dealt with the 
existence of a right of residence for third country national (TCN) spouses, first on 
the basis of Directive 2004/38, then on the basis of Article 21 TFEU. Concerning 
the Directive, he concluded that a citizen could not rely upon it in her own State of 
nationality, as expected. First, he recalled that the provisions of Directive 2004/38 
do not confer any autonomous right on TCN who are family members of a Union 
citizen. Then, appealing to the sacred trilogy of EU law interpretative techniques, 
he stated that a “literal, systematic and teleological interpretation of the Directive” 
excludes a person such as Ms Ormazabal, and so her spouse, from its scope of 
application ratione personae. Provisions of the Directive, as stated by Article 3(1), 
govern the situation of a citizen and their family members “who move to or reside 
in a Member State other than that of which they are a national”. So, the exercise of 
her freedom of movement is not sufficient to allow a citizen to fall within the scope 
of application ratione personae of the Directive when she resides in one of her 
States of nationality, even if she has another EU nationality. 
As Mr Lounes could not benefit from any rights based on Directive 2004/38, 
Advocate General Bot enquired if he could benefit from a derived right of residence 
on the basis of the Treaty. Recalling that Article 21(1) TFEU has been given “an 
extremely dynamic interpretation” by the Court, he used mainly O. and B.17 as “a 
framework for interpretation”. In that case, specifying the Singh model, the Court 
decided that the provisions of Directive 2004/38 should apply by analogy to the 
spouse of a citizen returning to their Member State of nationality when they have 
genuinely resided in another Member State. As the Advocate General explained, 
derived rights in O. and B. are justified, as in Singh and Eind,18 because granting 
less favourable treatment than was applicable to the family in the host Member State 
would deter the citizen or the worker from leaving his State of nationality.19 The 
reasoning is rather sinuous, but could be seen as a typical figure of EU freedom of 
                                                     
13Opinion, para 36. 
14Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern, EU:C:2010:104. 
15Ibid., para 39. Compare to para 42 of Rottmann : “the situation of a citizen of the Union … in a 
position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 17 EC and the rights attaching 
thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law”. 
16Azoulai, “The ‘retained powers’ formula in the case law of the European Court of Justice: EU law 
as total law?”, 4 European Journal of Legal Studies (2011), 192-219. 
17Case C-456/12, O. v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel v. B., EU:C:2014:135. 
18Case C-291/05, Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R. N. G. Eind, EU:C:2007:771. 
19Opinion, para 77. 
  
movement law: the obstacle experienced upon return is taken into account as an 
obstacle to leaving the Member State of nationality.20 
This solution “seems to [Advocate General Bot] transposable” to the case at 
hand. Though “there has been no physical movement”, “by choosing to be 
naturalized in the host Member State, Ms García Ormazábal expressed her wish to 
live in that State in the same way as she would be prompted to live in her Member 
State of origin, building strong, lasting ties with the host Member State and 
becoming permanently integrated in that State”.21 The Advocate General drew a 
parallel between the citizen who returns to his State of nationality and the citizen 
who makes the host State his State of nationality. He seemed to hold that the 
acquisition of British nationality by Ms Ormazabal should be treated as would her 
return to Spain. To develop the underlying logic of the Opinion, it could be said that 
in both cases an EU citizen is newly settling in his State of nationality; physically 
when he moves; metaphorically when he is naturalized. 
Advocate General Bot then moved on to assert that the application by analogy 
of Directive 2004/38 “is even more necessary” because of the “inextricable link” 
between the exercise of the right conferred by the Directive and the naturalization. 
This link exists because the right of permanent residence permits her to meet the 
conditions to be naturalized, but also because the naturalization is seen as the 
“logical conclusion” of “her integration in the host State”. To deprive her of her 
rights, especially her family rights, because “she has sought to become more deeply 
integrated in the host Member State, would annihilate the effectiveness of the rights 
which she derives from Article 21 (1) TFEU”.22 It would be, he insisted, “illogical 
and full of contradictions”. 23  So, he held that an EU citizen who has been 
naturalized in the home State, “following and by reason” of her residence under 
Article 16 of the Directive, must be able to live with her spouse under the same 
conditions that applied before her naturalization or that she would face if she moved 
to another Member State. 
Advocate General Bot insisted on the fact that, to obtain a derived right of 
residence for her spouse, the citizen must have created a family life during the 
period of residence of the citizen, pursuant to Article 16 of Directive 2004/38, and 
mentioned that this was the situation of Mr Lounes and Ms Ormazabal.24 However, 
                                                     
20 For a proposal to abandon these intricacies by recognizing “a right to go back to one’s own 
country”, see Spaventa, “Family rights for circular migrants and frontier workers: O and B, and S 
and G”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 753-777, at 775. For a discussion of the different interpretations that 
could be given to Singh, see Tryfonidou, “Family reunification rights of (migrant) Union citizens: 
Towards a more liberal approach”, 15 ELJ (2009), 634-653, at 639 et seq. 
21Opinion, para 83. 
22Ibid., para 86. 
23Ibid., para 87. 
24 See para 90 of the Opinion: “the effectiveness of the rights conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU 
demands that Union citizens, such as Ms García Ormazábal, who have acquired the nationality of 
the host Member State following and by reason of residence under and in conformity with the 
conditions set out in Article 16 of the Directive, should be able to continue the family life they have 
until then led in that State with their spouse, a third-country national” (my emphasis). See also the 
proposed operative part: “in situations such as that at issue, in which Union citizens have acquired 
the nationality of the Member State in which they have genuinely resided pursuant to and in 
conformity with the conditions set out in Article 16 of Directive 2004/38 and have during that period 
  
nothing attests that they were in such a situation. On the contrary, the Advocate 
General himself stated that they began a relationship four years after the 
naturalization of Ms Ormazabal.25 There is an important discrepancy between the 
factual situation and the abstract formula presented as typifying that situation. 
 
 
4. The Judgment 
 
The Court confirmed that an EU citizen residing in her State of nationality does not 
fall within the definition of a “beneficiary” within the meaning of Directive 
2004/38, even if the citizen has another EU nationality and she has exercised her 
freedom of movement. Therefore, someone in the situation of Mr Lounes could not 
benefit from a derived right of residence on the basis of the Directive. On the 
interpretation of Article 21 of the TFEU, the Court concluded, like the Advocate 
General, that the conditions for granting a derived right of residence to someone in 
the situation of Mr Lounes must not be stricter than those provided for by Directive 
2004/38. Nonetheless, both the justification of this solution and its delimitation 
contrast significantly with the Opinion. 
Mentioning O. and B. and Chavez-Vilchez and Others, the Court stated that a 
TCN family member of an EU citizen may be accorded a right of residence based 
on Article 21(1), and that this right is not autonomous but derived from the rights 
enjoyed by the Union citizen. Such a right exists, “in principle, only when it is 
necessary in order to ensure that the Union citizen can exercise his freedom of 
movement effectively”.26 This focus on movement is surprising and was absent 
from the Opinion of the Advocate General.27 Nevertheless, it may not be taken too 
seriously; we might simply be before a case of mechanical circulation of formulas. 
Indeed, this is not the first time that the Court uses the formula establishing a 
connection between the derived right to reside and free movement.28 The Court has 
even used this formula to justify a derived right of residence in the absence of 
connection with freedom of movement. 29  Moreover, the Court immediately 
tempered this assertion by saying that “[t]he purpose and justification of a derived 
right of residence are therefore based on the fact that a refusal to allow such a right 
would be such as to interfere, in particular, with that freedom and with the exercise 
and the effectiveness of the rights which Article 21(1) TFEU affords the Union 
citizen concerned”.30 
Indeed, the Court then stated that the right to lead a normal family life is among 
                                                     
created a family life with a third-country national” (my emphasis). This is even clearer in the original 
French version, where the A.G. states that family life should be created “à cette occasion”. 
25Opinion, para 22. 
26Judgment, para 48. 
27 By contrast, A.G. Bot mentioned “his rights to move and reside freely in the European 
Union” (Opinion, para 45, my emphasis). The same dissonance could be found between the Opinion 
of A.G. Sharpston and the Judgment in Case C-456/12, O. and B. (see, respectively, paras. 45 and 
49; my emphasis). 
28See e.g. Case C-456/12, O. and B., para 45. 
29See e.g. Case C-40/11, Yoshikazu Iida v. Stadt Ulm, EU:C:2012:691, paras. 68-72. 
30Judgment, para 49. 
  
the rights conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU.31 More than freedom of movement, it 
is this right to lead a normal family life that appears central to the reasoning: “[a] 
national of one Member State who has moved to and resides in another Member 
State cannot be denied that right merely because he subsequently acquires the 
nationality of the second Member State in addition to his nationality of origin, 
otherwise the effectiveness of Article 21(1) TFEU would be undermined”.32 To 
support its statement, the Court resorts to two series of arguments. 
It first states that denying a citizen in the position of Ms Ormazabal her right to 
lead a normal family life “would amount to treating him in the same way as a citizen 
of the host Member State who has never left that State, disregarding the fact that 
the national concerned has exercised his freedom of movement by settling in the 
host Member State and that he has retained his nationality of origin”.33 Although it 
is not adverted to, the presence of Garcia Avello is very palpable. This argument is 
also supported by another formula, secretly but obviously taken from Micheletti,34 
according to which “[a] Member State cannot restrict the effects that follow from 
holding the nationality of another Member State”.35 This will be discussed later. 
The core of the reasoning to establish that the effectiveness of the rights (note 
the change to the plural, taken from the Court) conferred by Article 21(1) has been 
undermined is to be found in the second line of arguments. Adopting the reasoning 
of the Advocate General, the argument holds to the construction of Article 21(1) 
TFEU as being intended “to promote the gradual integration of the Union citizen 
concerned in the society of the host Member State” 36  and to a reading of 
naturalization in the host State as proceeding from the will “to become more deeply 
integrated in the society of [the State of naturalization]”.37 Forgoing rights destined 
to promote integration because one sought to integrate deeply would be “contrary 
to the underlying logic of gradual integration that informs Article 21(1) TFEU”.38 
Therefore, the effectiveness of the rights conferred on EU citizens by Article 
21(1) TFEU implies that citizens in the situation of Ms Ormazabal are still able to 
enjoy the rights arising under that provision after they acquire the nationality of the 
host Member State, and in particular, that they “must be able to build a family life 
with their third-country-national spouse, by means of the grant of a derived right of 
residence to that spouse”.39 The Court concluded that conditions for granting that 
derived right of residence to a TCN, who is family member of a Union citizen 
having exercised his right of free movement by “settling in” a Member State other 
than that of which he is a national, should not be stricter than those provided for in 
Directive 2004/38. The Directive must apply by analogy. 
In the operative part of the Judgment, the Court delimited the situation in which 
                                                     
31Ibid., para 52. 
32Ibid., para 53. 
33Ibid., para 54. 
34Case C-369/90, Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, 
EU:C:1992:295. 
35Ibid., para 55. 
36Judgment, para 56. 
37Ibid., para 58. 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid., para 60. 
  
this solution prevails in the following way: the citizen “(i) has exercised his freedom 
of movement by moving to and residing in a Member State other than that of which 
he is a national, under Article 7(1) or Article 16(1) of that Directive, (ii) has then 
acquired the nationality of that Member State, while also retaining his nationality 
of origin, and (iii) several years later, has married a third-country national with 
whom he continues to reside in that Member State”.40 Differences with the Opinion 
of Advocate General Bot should be underlined. First, the Court, taking its definition 
of genuine residence from O. and B., decided that residence pursuant to Article 7(1) 
of the Directive is sufficient. Then, as noted earlier, the Advocate General required 
that family life has been developed when that citizen was residing under EU law, 
while the Court underlined that the wedding took place several years after the 
naturalization. Finally, the Court mentioned that the sponsor should have kept their 
first nationality in the operative part, unlike the Advocate General. 
 
 
5. Comments 
 
This annotation will discuss various questions: the affirmation of a right to lead a 
normal family life (5.1); the respective role of dual nationality and free 
movement (5.2); how naturalization is linked to the right to move and reside by the 
intermediation of integration (5.3); and how Directive 2004/38 is used to avoid its 
own limitations (5.4). 
 
5.1. A right to lead a normal family life conferred by Article 21 TFEU 
 
For her spouse to obtain a derived right of residence, Advocate General Bot requires 
the citizen to have created a family life during the period of residence pursuant to 
Article 16 of Directive 2004/38. As mentioned earlier, he also noted that this was 
the situation of Mr Lounes and Ms Ormazabal, although it was clearly not the case. 
Had the Court adopted this formulation, it would have been difficult for the 
referring judge to determine if someone in the situation of Mr Lounes could benefit 
from a derived right of residence. It would have to choose between privileging the 
solution implied by the case and favoring its formulation. To take the opposition 
proposed by Komárek in a slightly different context, the referring court would have 
to choose between a “case-bound model” and a “legislative model” of reasoning.41 
What might be taken as a misprint in the Opinion can be seen rather as a 
revealing confusion: it underlines why it is difficult to both take O. and B. as a 
“framework for interpretation” and conclude that, in a situation such as the one of 
Ms Ormazabal, the spouse may obtain a derived right of residence under EU law. 
Indeed, in cases following the Singh model, it is of a crucial importance that the 
citizen has developed her family life before coming back to her State of nationality. 
                                                     
40These conditions can be found in the first sentence of the operative part, interpreting Directive 
2004/38. Nevertheless, the second sentence, interpreting Art. 21 TFEU, should be read as following 
the first one, as is clear in the French version where they form only one paragraph. 
41 Komárek, “Reasoning with previous decisions: Beyond the doctrine of precedent”, 61 AJCL 
(2013), 149-173. 
  
Otherwise, the justification based on the obstacle to movement appears difficult to 
maintain. Advocate General Bot makes an analogy between the acquisition of 
nationality and the return to the home State. Accepting this analogy, the logic 
underpinning O. and B. justifies requiring a family life during the residence of the 
citizen in the host Member State.42 
However, this reference to O. and B. appears of little relevance for an EU citizen 
who had developed a family life when she was already a British citizen. If in 2009 
Ms Ormazabal had returned to Spain instead of acquiring British citizenship, and 
several years after her return developed a family life there with Mr Lounes, it is 
difficult to imagine that her husband could obtain a derived right of residence 
following O. and B. In O. and B., the Court recognized such a right for situations 
“where a Union citizen has created or strengthened a family life with a third-country 
national during genuine residence”.43 If the deterrent effect on movement is more 
assumed than established in most of the cases decided by the Court following Singh, 
it seems untenable to assume such an effect when family life starts after the return.44 
It would have been possible for the Advocate General to choose another 
interpretation of Singh according to which the granting of family rights does not 
need to be directly linked to the exercise of free movement. This would correspond 
to the “liberal approach” according to Tryfonidou, where “the mere proof of the 
existence of the requisite family link, together with the exercise of some kind of 
inter-state movement, suffices for the bestowal by the Treaty free movement of 
persons provisions of automatic family reunifications rights on third-country 
nationals and their Member State national family members”.45 Nevertheless, this 
interpretation does not fit with O. and B. which clearly interprets Singh and Eind as 
justified by the deterrent effect on leaving. Far from contesting this reading, 
Advocate General Bot explains that “[t]he ratio decidendi for this approach was 
that if the third-country national had no such right, the worker, a Union citizen, 
could be deterred from leaving the Member State of which he is a national”.46 
The Court did not follow this reasoning based on the Singh model. It stated that 
the right to lead a normal family life is conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU, 
mentioning neither the Charter nor the ECHR.47 One should note the originality of 
this statement; it strongly differs from O. and B. While the possibility of leading a 
family life when returning to the home State was crucial, the right to family life 
was significantly absent in the ruling. It also contrasts with Metock, even if the 
Court mentions this last case as a reference in paragraph 52 of Lounes. Although 
                                                     
42This is the reasoning followed by the A.G.; see para 90 of the Opinion and the operative part 
proposed by the A.G. 
43Case C-456/12, O. and B., operative part (my emphasis). The case of Mr B. led the Court to be 
extremely clear: to rely on Art. 21 TFEU, the TCN must have, “at least during part of his residence 
in the host Member State, the status of family member, within the meaning of Article 2(2) of 
Directive 2004/38” (para 63). 
44Speaking of a presumption in O. and B., see Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 20, at 770. Explaining 
that this reasoning could not hold as movement didn’t have any impact on Mr Singh’s right of 
residence in Singh, see Tryfonidou, op. cit. supra note 20, at 640. 
45Tryfonidou, op. cit. supra note 20, at 639. 
46Opinion, para 77. 
47Judgment, para 52. 
  
emblematic of the “liberal jurisprudence” of the Court, this case did not go as far as 
recognizing a self-standing right to lead a family life, but states that “if Union 
citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in the host Member State, the 
exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously 
obstructed”. 48  Finally, it is also different to stating that a provision should be 
interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to respect for family life (like in 
Carpenter),49 or to deciding that the right to respect for family life, as enshrined in 
Article 7 of the Charter or Article 8 of the ECHR, should be taken into account by 
the Member State (as in Dereci, Chavez-Vilchez and Others or Rendón Marín).50 
In the Singh model, at least under its interpretation in O. and B., family life is 
not really presented as a right, but as a factual situation impeding free movement 
rights. Recognizing, as the Court does, that a TCN should benefit from a derived 
right of residence even if he has married the citizen several years after the latter has 
acquired the nationality of the State of residence entails a different vision of family 
life. It is no longer sufficient to consider the effect on free movement of not being 
able to continue a family life developed in another Member State, even in a very 
wide interpretation of what counts as an obstacle to movement. The question is not 
whether Ms Ormazabal could continue to enjoy the family life she was enjoying 
under the protection of EU law, it is whether she would lose the right to develop 
such a family life. One important question that is not answered is how long she 
should keep such a right. The Court only states that this is possible in the case of a 
wedding taking place “several years” after the naturalization. 
 
5.2. Dual nationality and/or the exercise of free movement rights? 
 
The respective roles of dual nationality and freedom of movement in the Opinion 
and in the Judgment are difficult to fathom. Dual nationality is not really considered 
by the Advocate General: in reasoning inspired by O. and B., the change of status 
is important but not the conservation of the first one. On the contrary, dual 
nationality seems to play an important role in the justification given by the Court. 
It is mentioned in the operative part of the judgment. However, the reasoning of the 
Court is rather confusing and the relation between dual nationality and the exercise 
of free movement rights is far from clear. Dual nationality figures at two stages of 
the ruling: first to trigger EU law, then to establish that the effectiveness of the rights 
conferred by Article 21 (1) TFEU would be undermined. 
Regarding the “connecting factor” that triggers the application of EU law, as 
already mentioned, the Advocate General refers to Rottmann. This reference is 
surprising. First, the situation in Lounes is rather different. What is to be lost is not 
the status of EU citizen, but the possibility of benefiting from rights deriving from 
this status in one Member State; and the cause of this loss is not the withdrawal of 
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a Member State nationality but the acquisition of a second one. Second, what was 
at stake were not the conditions of acquisition or loss of a nationality, but the 
consequences attached to it by a specific piece of legislation. Third, appealing to 
the nature and the consequence of the situation to establish the connection with EU 
law might not be necessary. As the Advocate General notes, it was not contested 
that the citizen used her freedom of movement. Choosing to reason using Rottmann 
is significant. It may be seen as an answer to Pham,51 where the UK Supreme Court 
directly contested Rottmann, and which was mentioned before the national court. 
The ECJ’s reasoning is completely different from that followed by the Advocate 
General. It has recourse neither to Rottmann nor to previous movement pursuant to 
EU law, but, referring to Freitag, it states in paragraph 50 that “there is a link with 
EU law with regard to nationals of one Member State who are lawfully resident in 
the territory of another Member State of which they are also nationals”. While 
Freitag has been decided recently, the Court appeals indirectly to highly 
emblematic rulings of citizenship case law. The first part of the formula comes 
directly from Martínez Sala.52 The last words can be seen as the assertion, famously 
made in Garcia Avello, that the formula is not defeated by the fact that the citizen 
is also a national of the host Member State.53 
The extremely wide formula of paragraph 50 may allow a dual national to trigger 
EU law as soon as he resides somewhere legally in an EU State, even in one of his 
States of nationality. It recalls the sentence of Advocate General Jacobs that “it 
cannot be acceptable that one nationality should eclipse the other depending on 
where they happen to be”.54 To take the expression coined by Steve Peers, a dual 
national could be seen as “Schrodinger’s EU citizen”,55 being at the same time a 
national of the State where he resides and a national of another Member State. In 
relation to the second quality, the Court decided that he may rely on the rights 
provided for by Article 21(1) TFEU, including the right to lead a normal family life. 
As in Garcia Avello, the Micheletti formula entails that the status of national of the 
host State does not interfere with the rights enjoyed by the citizen as the national of 
another State.56 
It may be said that the Court is attaching the right to lead a normal family life to 
Article 21 TFEU, as it has attached the right not to suffer discrimination on grounds 
of nationality to Article 20 TFEU in Martínez Sala57. In Lounes, the Court did not 
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mention any provision recognizing a right to family life, whereas it could have said 
that this right resulted from Article 7 of the Charter. Obviously, this could be 
criticized: the right to move and reside freely provided for by Article 21 TFEU is 
subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the 
measures adopted to give them effect, whereas the Charter applies only when 
Member States are implementing Union law. Nevertheless, one should remember 
that Martínez Sala was subject to the same kind of criticism: the right laid down in 
Article 18 TFEU is also limited to the scope of application of the Treaties and 
Article 20 TFEU states that the citizen “shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the 
duties provided for in the Treaties”.58 
Nonetheless, the Court did not go as far as totally applying the logic followed 
for non-discrimination to family life. First, the right is not directly attached to the 
status of EU citizen but to the right to move and reside freely. Then, the Court also 
underlined that Ms Ormazabal has exercised her freedom to move and reside in a 
Member State other than her Member State of origin59. This would not be relevant 
following Garcia Avello logic, but this takes into account McCarthy, where the 
Court decided that Article 21 TFEU was not applicable to a dual national who had 
never exercised her right of free movement, except in the case of deprivation of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of her status 
as a Union citizen (Ruiz Zambrano like situation) or in the case of impediment of 
the exercise of her right of free movement and residence within the territory of the 
Member States (Grunkin and Paul like situation). 
As already noted, dual nationality is also present later in the ruling, when the 
Court asserts that refusing to grant a right to family life to Ms Ormazabal would be 
treating as similar a national who “has exercised his freedom of movement by 
settling in the host Member State” while “retain[ing] his nationality of origin” and 
“a citizen of the host Member State who has never left that State”. 60 First, what is 
confusing is that the Court applies the Aristotelian conception of equality entailing 
that “different situations must not be treated in the same way”, famously applied in 
Garcia Avello.61 However, this conception of equality has been widely criticized 
and since then has not been used in citizenship case law.62 
Then, a crucial difference is that the Court also takes into consideration the 
movement of Ms Ormazabal. At first sight, it even recalls D’Hoop: the Court is 
comparing citizens who have exercised their freedom of movement and citizens 
who have not. 63 Nonetheless, the Court is no longer sanctioning discrimination 
against the movers.64 It is, on the contrary, sanctioning similar treatment of free 
movers and nationals where they are taken to be in different situations, thus 
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justifying different treatment. In that part, the Court is comparing the situation of 
dual nationals who have moved, such as Ms Ormazabal, with British citizens who 
have never moved. It is difficult to assess the respective importance of movement 
and dual nationality in defining these two groups of British citizens which should 
be treated differently. Nevertheless, this part of the ruling justifies a reverse 
discrimination, allowing British free movers and/or dual nationals to be treated 
differently from settled British citizens. 
Consequently, what dual nationality implies is far from clear. The Court uses 
some of its most famous and contested formulas in a new context and with 
important modifications, without referring to the original cases, let alone explaining 
why they could be used in the situation at hand.65 This has important consequences 
in assessing the scope of the ruling. Considering the different situations resulting 
from the exercise of movement, dual nationality is not relevant, as in the reasoning 
proposed by the Advocate General. What is decisive is that a national of a Member 
State acquires the nationality of another Member State. One should recall that the 
Court has even recognized the right not to suffer discrimination on grounds of 
nationality for a naturalized citizen who did not keep his previous nationality 
– considering him an “honorary foreigner”. 66  On the contrary, in a reasoning 
inspired by Garcia Avello, dual nationality could be important in triggering EU law 
when a citizen is living in one of his States of nationality.67 In that case, even if one 
adopts McCarthy, a connection between movement and naturalization does not 
appear necessary. Dual nationals since birth or by wedding may be concerned by 
this solution, provided they have previously used their free movement rights.68 
 
5.3. Naturalization as “the logical conclusion” of the EU citizen’s integration 
 
The Court, adopting the reasoning of Advocate General Bot, presents Article 21 (1) 
as promoting the “gradual integration” of the Union citizen in the society of the host 
Member State. Integration is seen as the prolongation of the exercise of free 
movement by a citizen who decides to settle in another State and can do so pursuant 
EU law. Naturalization is presented as the “logical conclusion” of integration, in 
the terms of the Advocate General, 69 or as a way to “become more deeply integrated 
in the society of that State”, in the terms of the Court.70  So, naturalization is 
conceived as the extension of integration, which is itself seen as the extension of 
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the right to move and reside in another Member State conferred by Article 21(1). 
Following this rationale, to speak in free movement terms, it could be said that 
deterring naturalization impedes the effectiveness of Article 21(1). 
This is clear in paragraph 59 of the judgment. The Court notes that “Union 
citizens who have exercised their freedom of movement and acquired the 
nationality of the host Member State in addition to their nationality of origin would, 
in so far as their family life is concerned, be treated less favourably than Union 
citizens who have also exercised that freedom but who hold only their nationality 
of origin”.71 The Court is no longer comparing citizens who have physically moved 
and citizens who have not. It is comparing, among citizens who have moved, those 
who have acquired British citizenship and those who have not. Restricting the 
movement of status would be similar to restricting physical movement. The 
acquisition of another European nationality by an EU citizen should not be 
discouraged by the prospect of losing his rights to family life. 
The relationship between integration and free movement in the ECJ case law 
could take different forms, which have changed over time, but which have arguably 
coexisted at the same time, in different cases or in different readings of the same 
cases. 72  The conception expressed in Lounes does not fit with a vision where 
integration is strictly instrumental to free movement, as in a case like S and G.73 
Integration and family life are conceived rather as the prolongation of movement. 
The Court is not trying to demonstrate that refusing a right to family life would 
deter the citizen from moving. It is defending the idea that movement in another 
society should not be detrimental to family life. Integration is seen as an objective 
if not as a right entailed by Article 21(1).74 As the affirmation of a right to lead a 
normal family life already suggests, family life is protected in itself. The loss of the 
right to lead a normal family life is taken as impeding the effectiveness of Article 
21(1), without any discussion of the effect of this loss on movement. 
Considering naturalization, it seems at first glance that the Court is attaching 
great importance to nationality, traditionally suspect in the context of free 
movement. Looking closer, it is necessary to add that, though the Court considers 
naturalization, it has been reconstructed in EU terms and it has acquired a meaning 
specific to an EU perspective. Conceiving naturalization as the logical consequence 
of the EU citizen’s integration, the Advocate General and the Court see the loss of 
rights stemming from EU citizenship as paradoxical and difficult to accept. On the 
contrary, before the national court, the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
defended a different conception of naturalization: “the acquisition of citizenship of 
a host Member State is a choice, to which advantages and disadvantages will 
attach”.75 In that national perspective, where nationality is a set of rights and duties, 
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76 it may be more understandable that acquiring a nationality entails the loss of 
certain rights stemming from EU law. 
Nonetheless, what is considered as illogical from a national point of view is not 
only that some nationals are offered better treatment than other nationals, but the 
fact that, overall, nationals have less rights than EU citizens concerning family 
reunification. This is what is expressed in some Newspaper titles criticizing the 
ruling: “EU citizens don't have to face same tough rules as Britons when bringing 
non-EU family members to UK, ECJ rules”.77 The heart of the matter, as is often 
the case in reverse discrimination cases, is to explain why a Member State treats its 
own nationals less favourably than EU citizens. As Advocate General Sharpston 
notes, “by denying residence, that Member State might be at risk of de facto 
‘expelling’ its own nationals, forcing them either to move to another Member State 
where EU law will guarantee that they can reside with their family members or 
perhaps to leave the European Union altogether. Such a measure sits oddly with the 
solidarity that is presumed to underlie the relationship between a Member State and 
its own nationals”.78  
In Directive 2004/38, rights conferred on EU citizens depend in part on the 
passage of time, a new situation in EU law.79 For the first three months, the right to 
reside in another Member State is free of conditions, following Article 6. Then, 
before permanent residence, the right to move and reside and the equality promised 
to EU citizens depends on the fulfilment of the conditions provided for in Article 7 
(i.e., for citizens without a specific quality, having sufficient resources and a 
comprehensive sickness insurance). The status of permanent residence frees the 
citizen from these requirements and gives enhanced protection against expulsion. 
If it sets a “gold standard”80 for EU citizens and their family members, Lounes could 
be read as recognizing that the possession of this status is not enough to be 
integrated as a national could be. The Court states that acquiring the nationality of 
a Member State demonstrates the intent of the citizen “to become permanently 
integrated in that State”.81 The link between nationality and integration could also 
be found in previous case law, when the Court took nationality as a sign of the 
integration of a national in his State of nationality.82 
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In the logic underpinning the ruling, the acquisition of nationality is stemming 
from the exercise of EU citizenship rights. From that perspective, nationality could 
be seen, beyond merely a national status, as another European status that an EU 
citizen could possess, going further than the status of permanent resident. We should 
recall that a classic observation about EU citizenship status is that, like a “federal 
citizenship”, its horizontal dimension is predominant. “The full integration of a 
Frenchman in the Italian society leads more to the ‘Italianization’ of this person 
than to the construction of ‘Europeans’ from French and Italians”.83 This statement 
is taken seriously in Lounes: EU citizenship is presented as allowing the Spanish 
citizen to be Britishized, or, more exactly, to be Britishized while keeping a specific 
status that distinguishes her from settled British citizens. The acquisition of the 
nationality of the host State falls within the ambit of EU citizenship law. 
This Europeanization is nonetheless limited. The Court does not recognize a 
right to be naturalized, neither does the Advocate General despite him referring to 
Rottmann.84  It only allows naturalization not to have an adverse effect in the 
enjoyment of rights stemming from Article 21(1), especially the right to lead a 
normal family life in the host Member State. Moreover, one should not forget that 
even if the facts of the case do not take place in a Brexit context, the ruling of the 
Court does. Acquiring British nationality for an EU citizen or acquiring another 
European nationality for a British citizen takes on a different meaning: more than 
expressing the feeling of being more integrated, it expresses the necessity to be 
naturalized to safeguard the rights enjoyed as an EU citizen in the absence of a 
withdrawal agreement securing these rights. If the judgment does not directly tackle 
this question, its conclusion may allow EU citizens who feel the need to adopt 
another nationality to avoid losing some of the rights they enjoy as EU citizens. 
This line of justification, common to the Opinion and to the judgment, does not 
really clarify the reach of the solution. As in the justification transposing O. and B., 
what is important is the acquisition of the new status – presented as the apex of the 
citizen’s integration. From that perspective, it is difficult to affirm that dual 
nationality should be relevant. Even if the Court has recognized the possibility of 
being integrated in different European societies, renouncing one’s nationality while 
acquiring the nationality of the host State could be hard to conceive as expressing 
a weaker desire to be integrated in the latter. Different from the reasoning 
transposing O. and B., it does not seem to be relevant that naturalization occurred 
before the development of family life. 
 
5.4. Playing off the Directive against itself 
 
Lounes certainly will not figure as an act of deference towards the European 
legislature. As in O. and B., the Court first states that Directive 2004/38 should not 
apply, but, later, that it should apply by analogy in virtue of the Treaty. This 
contrasts with the technique adopted in Singh, in the context of the freedom of 
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establishment, where the Court justified its solution by mentioning the Treaty and 
the Directive in question “properly construed”. 85  What is new and striking in 
Lounes is that the Directive plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the Treaty 
itself. The Court is elliptical: it only talks of “the underlying logic of gradual 
integration that informs Article 21(1) TFEU”. 86 This logic of gradual integration, 
essentially to be found in Directive 2004/38,87 is assigned to Article 21(1) by the 
Court in order to escape the limitations set down in the Directive (and mentioned 
in Art. 21(1)). In that sense, the Directive is played off against itself. This 
instrumentalization of the Directive could also be seen in the way the Court uses its 
conceptual apparatus to determine when Article 21(1) applies and what follows 
from this application. By using the categories of the Directive, it escapes a case-by-
case analysis, which could be found in other contexts.88 
First, the Court uses the categories of the Directive to determine which situation 
can lead to the recognition of a derived right of residence. In the operative part, it 
requires residence under Articles 7(1) or 16(1). This technique has already been 
used in O. and B. to assert a “genuine residence” on the part of the citizen in the 
host State before his return – residence under Article 6 is excluded, probably so as 
not to cover nationals who go abroad in order to bypass national law.89 In Lounes, 
the justification for this limitation is less clear – the Court mentions the citizen who 
“has exercised his freedom of movement by settling in the host Member State”.90 
Nevertheless, there is no discussion about the different forms of movement, 
contrary to O. and B. and to the Opinion of the Advocate General. This requirement 
has the consequence of excluding citizens who do not meet the conditions of the 
Directive or dual nationals who have not resided in the host State in application of 
EU law (for instance dual nationals since birth). In the rhetoric used by the Advocate 
General and the Court, it allows the assertion of the link between EU law and the 
situation: naturalization is constructed as the prolongation of the exercise of the 
rights recognized by the Directive. 
Further, as in O. and B., what follows from the application of Article 21(1) is the 
application “by analogy” of Directive 2004/38. This permits the circumscription of 
the “right to lead a normal family life” found in Article 21 by the Court. So, this 
right has the same limitations: it concerns only family relations recognized by 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive. Beyond the critiques that could be addressed to 
                                                     
85Case C-370/90, Singh, para 25. 
86Judgment, para 58. It nonetheless mentioned Recital 18 in the presentation of the legal context; 
ibid., para 3. 
87 Recital 18 considers that the right to permanent residence aims to be “a genuine vehicle for 
integration into the society of the host Member State”. Recital 24 explains that “the greater the 
degree of integration of Union citizens and their family members in the host Member State, the 
greater the degree of protection against expulsion should be”.  
88To determine if the situation led to a restriction to Art. 21 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-60/00, Carpenter 
or Case C-457/12, S. and G. To assess the integration of the citizen, see e.g. Case C-359/13, Martens. 
89 By doing so, the Court excludes situations that might have been included in a case-by-case 
consideration. It should be recalled that, unlike the Court, A.G. Sharpston proposed a case-by-case 
assessment; see Opinion in Case C-456/12, O. and B., EU:C:2013:837, paras. 95-111. 
90Judgment, para 54 and operative part (my emphasis). 
  
this limitation, the application, “mutadis mutandis”,91 of the Directive to situations 
to which it is not supposed to apply, leads to some difficulties.92 The Latin locution 
used by the Advocate General implies that something needs to be changed in the 
application of the rule. This results from the fact that the Court did not go as far as 
only viewing the dual national residing in one of his States of nationality as a 
national of one Member State residing in the territory of another Member State. If 
it had done so, it would have been possible to apply directly Directive 2004/38 
without using Article 21(1) and its conditions and limitations would apply for a 
national. The Secretary of State defended this approach in McCarthy: it refused to 
grant Ms McCarthy a residence permit because she did not meet the conditions 
required by the Directive 2004/38 and not because she was also a British citizen.93 
The Court did not follow this reasoning. In Eind, it already decided that the right 
of a national to go back and reside in his State of nationality cannot be refused or 
made conditional.94 In McCarthy, it clearly stated that Directive 2004/38 could not 
apply directly to a dual national residing in one of his States of nationality as he 
“enjoys an unconditional right of residence due to the fact that he resides in the 
Member State of which he is a national”.95 So, contrary to what the Court is saying, 
the application by analogy does not necessarily equal the necessity that “the 
conditions for granting that derived right of residence must not be stricter than those 
provided for by Directive 2004/38”.96 The situation of someone like Ms Ormazabal 
can be more advantageous than that of a national of another Member State residing 
in the UK. Indeed, the latter would be subject to the conditions set down in the 
Directive whereas they do not apply to the naturalized citizen. True, this should be 
nuanced because the naturalized citizen should also have met these conditions in 
the past, as the Court required that they have been resident under Article 3 or 16 of 
the Directive. Nevertheless, it is no longer required of someone like Ms Ormazabal, 
whereas if she had not acquired British citizenship, she would still need to meet the 
conditions provided for by the Directive before acquiring a right to permanent 
residence. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The ruling under examination is far from clear. The difficulty is in part a classic 
one, and lies in the relationship between what is decided in a specific case – even a 
hypothetical case like in a preliminary reference – and the justification given for 
this decision. It is made more acute in Lounes because different lines of reasoning 
are used to justify someone in the situation of Mr Lounes benefiting from a derived 
right of residence. In the operative part, the Court circumscribed very closely what 
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the characteristics of this situation are. Nonetheless, depending on the reading of 
the judgment adopted, one could consider dual nationality, the exercise of free 
movement rights, or the moment when family life begins as being decisive in 
reaching that solution. All this might be seen as technicalities reserved to EU 
lawyers, but is crucial to determining the scope of application of the solution given 
in Lounes. 
The difficulty is connected to the fact that in Lounes the Court uses well-known 
formulas of its citizenship case law, decided to solve specific cases, and transposes 
them to a different context, without always mentioning the original cases, let alone 
explaining why they could be used in the situation at hand. This is no particularity 
of the Lounes case. In fact, the ECJ case law is replete with such instances of 
“decontextualization” and circulation of formulas.97 The formulas coined by the 
Court to decide this case might circulate in the future as well. Thus, even though 
the situation of Ms Ormazabal and Mr Lounes was not at all related to Brexit, the 
judgment might prove crucial in the Brexit context, especially in the absence of a 
withdrawal agreement securing the rights of EU citizens. 
Indeed, Lounes might be read as a signal that the Court will protect British 
citizens living in another Member State and willing to acquire another EU 
nationality, and EU citizens living in the UK and willing to acquire British 
citizenship. From this point of view, one might say that in Lounes, like in 
Commission v. UK98 mentioned in the introduction, the Court has played politics. 
Still, in contrast to that case, in Lounes the Court has not shown deference to avoid 
criticism. Through a daring interpretation of Article 21 TFEU, it protects an EU 
citizen against her own State. Lounes may rather be seen as an activist case and 
might even be used as an argument to limit the role of the Court after Brexit day, a 
question which will be part of the withdrawal agreement. 
Beyond Brexit, the Court’s justification and the formula it coined to decide 
Lounes may be used in the future to develop the status of EU citizen in different 
ways. The recognition of a right to lead a normal family life directly conferred by 
Article 21(1) TFEU may be used to develop the protection of EU citizens. 
Further, Lounes in a way rearticulates the status of national of a Member State 
and the status of EU citizen. Being a Member State national is no longer only the 
condition for being an EU citizen. The status of national of a Member State is 
constructed as the logical conclusion of the EU citizen’s integration in another 
Member State. At first this appears as a recognition of the limitation of the status of 
EU citizen: being treated as a national is not the same thing as being a national. In 
a gradual citizenship, nationality of the Member State of residence would be a 
higher status than that of permanent resident conferred by Directive 2004/38. 
However, another way to see things is to say that in Lounes, the status of national 
is, to some extent, Europeanized. Naturalization is seen as the prolongation of free 
movement and is subject to the Court’s review. EU citizenship not only permits a 
                                                     
97On this point, see Réveillère, Le juge et le travail des concepts juridiques: le cas de la citoyenneté 
de l’Union européenne (European University Institute, 2017), at 296 et seq. 
98Case C-308/14, Commission v. United Kingdom. 
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Spaniard to be treated like a UK citizen, it also secures some of her rights if she 
decides to become a UK citizen. 
 
Vincent Réveillère* 
